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SERIOUS NOTICE: A CELEBRATION,
DISCUSSION, AND RECOGNITION OF JOEL
REIDENBERG’S WORK ON PRIVACY NOTICES
AND DISCLOSURES
Tal Z. Zarsky*
This Essay pays tribute to Professor Joel Reidenberg’s rich academic
career and, specifically, to his contributions to the study of privacy policies.
In doing so, this Essay takes a close look at privacy policies and possible
ways to effectively intermediate their content through various labeling
schemes. While severely flawed, privacy policies are here to stay. Therefore,
an in-depth analysis of ways to enhance their efficiency is merited. This
Essay thus examines key strategies for privacy-related intermediation,
obstacles, and problems arising in the process, as well as possible solutions.
The analysis weaves together theoretical and empirical privacy law
scholarship (much of it by Professor Reidenberg), “classic” work on the
limits of disclosure policy, and general scholarship on certification.
Part I of this Essay provides a brief introduction to privacy policies and
the challenges of their intermediation. Part II examines the additional steps
that must be taken to ensure that privacy intermediation is effective and
efficient in terms of the system’s design, especially through setting disclosure
objectives and priorities. It also addresses the use of personalized disclosure
and its possible shortcomings. Part III assumes that privacy intermediation
is successful and confronts the potential problems that may lead to the
trivialization of labels and rankings over time. These dynamics result from
a possible flood of appeals for reevaluation and ensuing grade inflation. This
part also briefly explains how such concerns may be mitigated through
proper design, tailored disclosures, and tinkering with the liability regime of
intermediaries. This Essay concludes with some parting thoughts about
Reidenberg’s substantial contribution to “law and technology” scholarship
and the ways others may develop it in years to come.
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INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATION AND PERSONAL PRELUDE
This Essay takes a close look at privacy policies. The motivation for this
somewhat mundane inquiry is simple: privacy policies are here to stay.
Therefore, we must figure out how to live with and utilize them. Although
they are deeply flawed, there are some ways in which the disclosure process
they enable could be improved. One way may be through intermediation,
which can help convey the message of these policies to the public at large.
This Essay examines key strategies of privacy-related intermediation, mostly
by relying on labels. It addresses the obstacles and problems related to the
main challenges of privacy policy labeling and suggests possible solutions
that utilize both human and automated processes. It also addresses secondary
challenges, such as problematic feedback loops between firms and labeling
intermediaries, that may ensue if labeling schemes prove popular and
effective. The analysis that follows weaves together theoretical and
empirical privacy law scholarship, “classic” work on the limits of disclosure
policy, and general scholarship on certification. This Essay also offers
concrete policy recommendations regarding the proper process of structuring
labels, noting the importance of formulating objectives and priorities
early on.
The initial motivational paragraph for this Essay conveys only a half-truth.
Although privacy policies are highly relevant and important in the privacy
and tech-law realm, the motivation for this exploration is mostly personal. I
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wish to pay tribute to the important work of Professor Joel Reidenberg by
linking together and discussing several papers he published in recent years
on topics related to privacy disclosures and labels. These papers added
crucial knowledge and depth to a key piece of the overall information privacy
law puzzle.
In the last two decades, I have spent many hours with Joel Reidenberg not
only by reading his work but also in personal encounters. Initially, it was
Joel’s innovative scholarship that introduced me to a broad array of key legal
concepts from the realm of law and technology. But many physical meetings
followed. I had the privilege and pleasure of engaging with Joel in multiple
locations over three continents. We often talked about culture, religion,
history, and family. Yet, naturally, most of our conversations were about
privacy law and technology.
Every time our conversations shifted to the discussion of privacy-related
issues, my ongoing impression of Joel Reidenberg was that he always took
these matters very seriously. Joel’s passion for privacy issues was apparent
from the first time I encountered his work over twenty years ago. I remember
clearly that, at our first face-to-face meeting a long time ago, Joel
enthusiastically told me, a total stranger at the time, of a recent and somewhat
obscure privacy-related legal development. After our conversation, as I
walked away, I noted to myself that I should strive to be more like Joel;
I should be taking things more seriously and convey that sense to others. I
continue striving to do so, with limited success. Although he is now gone,
Joel continues to inspire me and many others of my generation, still setting
an unachievable standard.
Joel Reidenberg applied his rigor and enthusiasm to an abundance of
privacy-related topics. He was a frequent virtual guest in my classroom.
Early on, he educated me and others on international personal data flows,
government surveillance, and educational privacy. There is much to discuss
about every one of these key contributions, as well as many others, and some
of my esteemed colleagues addressed them in recent academic scholarship.1
Yet, in this Essay, I choose to focus on a relatively recent thread in Joel’s
scholarship—perhaps his last writings—on the nature of privacy disclosures.
This work, which Joel carried out with several coauthors, has contributed
constructive insights to promote the use of privacy disclosures. To achieve
these insights, which cautiously advocate the use of privacy-related public
disclosures, Joel Reidenberg set aside existing overall skepticism toward
such disclosure practices and reconsidered how and when they should be
applied.2 It is, in other words, serious work by a serious scholar in an area in
which many others have contributed mostly mockery and criticism.
1. See 25th Annual BTLJ-BCLT Symposium: Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, BERKLEY L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/
research/bclt/bcltevents/btlj-bclt-symposium-lex-informatica-the-formulation-ofinformation-policy-rules-through-technology/ [https://perma.cc/M93S-JN6N] (last visited
Feb. 2, 2022).
2. Professor Ari Waldman noted: “There is voluminous scholarship on privacy notices
and their faults. Less work has been done on their design.” Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy,
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Joel Reidenberg built bridges and brought worlds together—something he
excelled in both personally and professionally. In other scholarship, he
brought U.S. and European law closer together, generating insights about
German and French law for the American audience.3 He also integrated the
historical lex mercatoria rules into the digital age.4 In the topic I discuss here,
Reidenberg brought together the issue of privacy and the broader scholarship
devoted to examining, critiquing, and designing disclosure strategies.5
This Essay takes a close look at disclosure policies with reference to
privacy, continually turning and returning to Reidenberg’s work as a point of
reference and inspiration. It focuses on the importance of, feasibility of, and
ability to optimize intermediation of such disclosure to the broader public,
especially through labeling—all given the understanding that privacy
policies will most likely continue to dominate the discourse regarding
privacy-related disclosures. Labels are structured forms of disclosure with
unique characteristics and established design and content. The objective of
a label is to convey a limited, but important, set of facts and statements to
users, in a manner they can grasp quickly and effectively. The intricacies of
labeling are widely discussed in a range of contexts. Below, I provide a
cursory glimpse into how these might relate to the privacy disclosure
discourse.6
Part I of this Essay begins with a brief introduction to privacy policies and
the challenges of intermediation. Next, it introduces Reidenberg’s recent
seminal contributions to the discussion of privacy notification and the ways
that intermediation of such information may be carried out, focusing on the
use of labels. It does so by providing limited commentary and framing
Reidenberg’s work within several broader themes related to the study of
privacy policies.
Part II examines the additional steps that must be taken to ensure that
privacy intermediation is effective and efficient in terms of the system’s
design. Based on foundational insights derived from the broader discourse
on regulatory disclosure, Part II points out the importance of setting
disclosure objectives and priorities. It further explains how this may be
achieved in the area of privacy, relying on methodologies Reidenberg and
others developed. The discussion also addresses the use of personalized
disclosure and its possible shortcomings.
Part III assumes that privacy intermediation is successful and confronts
potential problems that could lead to the trivialization of labels and rankings
over time. These relate to a possible flood of appeals for reevaluation and
Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 74, 81 (2018). For a discussion of both forms of
scholarship, see M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1054–55 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS
261 (2002).
4. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998).
5. For a discussion of this void, see Waldman, supra note 2, at 77.
6. See infra notes 91–95.
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ensuing “grade inflation.” Such concerns are likely to compromise the
labeling process—a risk somewhat ironically rendered more acute as the
means of intermediation, such as labels or ranking, gain importance and
salience. This part also briefly explains how these concerns, which must be
addressed early on to ensure effective intermediation, may be mitigated
through proper design, disclosures, and tinkering with the liability regime of
the intermediaries. The Essay concludes with some parting thoughts about
Reidenberg’s substantial contribution to this area of scholarship and how it
may be developed by others in years to come.
I. REIDENBERG (AND OTHERS) ON ASSESSING AND IMPROVING PRIVACY
DISCLOSURES: MAKING INTERMEDIATION WORK
This part closely examines how information included in privacy policies
can be effectively conveyed to the public, while framing, presenting, and
commenting on Reidenberg’s work on this issue. It begins by noting the
substantial flaws in the common forms of privacy disclosures, given the
difficulty of understanding the diverse, immense, and dense texts. Next, it
considers whether the vastness of the task may be overcome by using
innovative intermediation techniques. After a brief primer on the nature of
privacy-related intermediation and its design options, this part examines the
utility of applying crowdsourcing and AI-driven measures to streamline
intermediation and relying, partially, on pre-approved texts. The analysis
addresses the shortcomings of such methods and the ways their proper
integration may overcome these challenges.
A. Privacy Policies: Neither Privacy nor a Policy
It is fair to assume that every entity interacting digitally with the public
while collecting personal information offers some form of a “privacy policy,”
a public-facing document detailing how the firm collects, analyzes, and uses
personal data. The motivations for drafting and presenting this document
may be legal, promotional, and at times, even genuinely part of an attempt to
educate the public about the firm’s use of personal information.7
Nevertheless, the document is very often filled with cryptic jargon,8 hidden
from the eye and accessible only through a link tucked away at the bottom of
a webpage.
The concept of the “privacy policy” displays impressive and surprising
resilience. After all, few ideas have been belabored more than privacy

7. Cf. David Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1399
(2018) (arguing terms can serve a precatory role, encouraging specific user behavior on the
platform).
8. For a recent study indicating that privacy policies are (still) unreadable for the average
user even after the enactment of the GDPR, see Shmuel I. Becher & Uri Benoliel, Law in
Books and Law in Action: The Readability of Privacy Policies and the GDPR, in CONSUMER
LAW AND ECONOMICS 179 (Klaus Mathis & Avishalom Tor eds., 2020).
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disclosures and “policies.”9 Yet, the privacy policy seems to survive and
thrive, at least as a point of reference in practical and academic discussions
of privacy law and policy.10 As Reidenberg noted, privacy policies remain
the “single most important source of information for users to attempt to learn
how companies collect, use, and share [personal] data.”11 One might
speculate that the miraculous resilience of privacy policies is quite likely the
result of the fact that they are the only privacy-enhancing measure almost
everyone can agree on implementing. In other words, they are the lowest
common denominator in the privacy regulation realm. For some, they are an
initial steppingstone toward additional, more aggressive privacy-enhancing
regulatory measures. For others, privacy policies are the least intrusive (and
innovation-impeding) measure that privacy regulation might mandate to
inform users and bridge information asymmetries.12
At the same time, privacy policies are clearly and utterly flawed. As
Professor Joseph Turow insightfully noted, the policies should not even be
allowed to carry a manipulative title. The term “privacy policy” suggests
that the disclosing entity provides a minimal, if not reasonable, level of
privacy protection, which it often does not.13 In view of this problematic
reality, scholars have naturally tended to discuss and criticize privacy
policies. They noted early on how the notion that users meaningfully consent
to the practices detailed in the privacy policy is nothing short of a bad joke
because of the information asymmetry and systematic user myopia.14
Indeed, no one reads privacy policies anyway.15 Life is too short to be spent
9. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Trustworthy Privacy Indicators: Grades, Labels,
Certifications and Dashboards, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (2019).
10. For example, see the discussion of mandating privacy notices as part of the White
House’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN
A NETWORKED WORLD:
A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING
INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 14 (2012) [hereinafter “White House
Report”],
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FKS9-GJ9X].
11. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 39 (2015).
12. For a similar and more detailed framing of privacy policies, see Calo, supra note 2, at
1029, 1048. For an argument that disclosure policies generally do not provide an adequate
compromise between the competing forces of nonintervention and calls for aggressive and, at
times, intrusive regulation, see generally Doron Teichman, Too Little, Too Much, Not Just
Right: Seduction by Contract and the Desirable Scope of Contract Regulation, 9 JERUSALEM
REV. LEGAL STUD. 52 (2014).
13. JOSEPH TUROW, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF PA., AMERICANS
ONLINE PRIVACY: THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN 3 (2003) (“57% of U.S. adults who use the internet
at home believe incorrectly that when a website has a privacy policy, it will not share their
personal information with other websites or companies.”). Although this study dates back to
2003, it may be wishful thinking to believe things have changed by 2022.
14. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1502
(2000); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,
1265 (1998). For additional sources, see Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the
Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 485,
491, 494 (2015).
15. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant
to Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S69, S71 (2016); see also OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E.
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pondering and contemplating the nonnegotiable, complicated, and long legal
terms of the privacy policies.16
Over the years, criticism of the ineffectiveness and consequent
insignificance of privacy notices has become increasingly pervasive and
persuasive, given several technological and social changes. The notices have
become longer,17 and with the growing use of smartphones, the screens on
which to view them have shrunk.18 At times, there is no screen on which to
review the privacy policies at all. When using gadgets and other technologies
within the “Internet of Things” (toys, bracelets, wearables, etc.), there is
merely a link or reference to a relevant text pertaining to the privacy policy.19
Many of these applications constantly collect personal data,20 merely
providing some notice regarding their privacy policies on a product-related
webpage.21
Furthermore, the privacy policy discussion has morphed into an extension
of a broader one, having to do with the troubles of disclosures in general.
Evidence has shown that, in this extended context, disclosure policies are
often unable to achieve their objectives of educating the public and enabling
meaningful choice.22 Discussions about privacy policies have blended into
the broader discourse regarding fairness of the legal fiction that foundational
documents, such as consumer form contracts, are part of the constructive
knowledge of users. Users rarely read and comprehend these documents;23
yet, according to accepted doctrine, the content binds the relevant contractual
parties. In other words, the application of an overarching duty to read renders

SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE
67–68 (2014).
16. On the length of time reading such notices requires, see Aleecia M. McDonald &
Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y
543 (2008).
17. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 148; Kevin Litman-Navarro,
Opinion, We Read 150 Privacy Policies. They Were an Incomprehensible Disaster, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/12/opinion/facebookgoogle-privacy-policies.html [https://perma.cc/9ZD2-FYMB].
18. White House Report, supra note 10, at 15.
19. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Towards Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 90, 95 (2014) (noting the
limited way privacy policies were presented to consumers of Internet of Things (IoT) devices).
To address this concern, scholars have suggested adding labels to IoT devices. See ALEXANDR
RAILEAN & DELPHINE REINHARDT, LET THERE BE LITE: DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF A LABEL
FOR IOT TRANSPARENCY ENHANCEMENT (2018).
20. ELLEN P. GOODMAN, ASPEN INST., THE ATOMIC AGE OF DATA: POLICIES FOR THE
INTERNET OF THINGS 23 (2015).
21. Eldar Haber, Toying with Privacy: Regulating the Internet of Toys, 80 OHIO ST. L.J.
399, 419 (2019) (demonstrating how, in the case of toys, privacy policies are displayed on
links available elsewhere); see also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 59 (2019) (discussing the weakening of
notice in the area of wearables and the “sensing net”).
22. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 3 (“‘Mandated disclosure’ may be the
most common and least successful regulatory technique in American law.”).
23. See Yanees Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?: Consumer Attention to
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014).
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even nonreading parties subject to certain rules and requirements, including
those related to privacy.24
B. Reidenberg and Privacy Policy Intermediation: Key Contributions
In several influential analytical and empirical papers, Reidenberg and his
coauthors sought to promote proper privacy disclosures. As a starting point,
they chose modest objectives for personal data usage disclosures, framing
them as part of the need to “provide consumers with more meaningful notice,
empower consumers, and nudge data processors to improve their privacy
notices and practices.”25 Much can be said about each of these elements. In
the interest of brevity, however, in this Essay, I accept the first two
objectives—notice and empowerment—as sufficiently sound, without
further analysis. Therefore, they will serve as the point of reference for the
rest of this discussion. Providing robust notice and empowering users can
also easily be premised on several theories, including enhancing user
autonomy and, possibly, the dynamics that promote privacy through market
pressures. I set the “nudging” element aside because it creates substantial
complications and invites nontrivial criticism of the legitimacy of “nudging”
efforts and their questionable success.26
Professor Reidenberg and his team moved forward to address possible
disclosures. The underlying assumption of the overall project was that
individuals do not (and possibly cannot) independently review and
sufficiently comprehend entire privacy policies in their current full format;
some form of effective intermediation must unfold.27 Thus, the question for
Reidenberg and his team was how such intermediation is best achieved.
1. Primer on Privacy Policy Intermediation
There are almost endless formats and models for privacy intermediation.28
An extensive literature describes efforts to enable effective intermediation
using technology and management-based tools.29 Yet, to date, the success
of such intermediation is limited for a variety of reasons. Here, I set aside
backward-looking discussions of historical failures to join in on
Reidenberg’s contemporary analysis, given recent technological

24. See Uri Benoliel & Shmuel I. Becher, The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. L.
REV. 2255, 2260–64 (2019) (discussing the justifications and ramifications of the duty to read
consumer contracts).
25. Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1414.
26. For a discussion of the critiques of nudging and possible responses, see Calo, supra
note 2, at 767–77.
27. See generally Reidenberg et al., supra note 9.
28. Irene Kamara & Paul De Hert, Data Protection Certification in the EU: Possibilities,
Actors and Building Blocks in a Reformed Landscape, in PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION
SEALS 12, 70–78 (Rowena Rodrigues & Vagelis Papakonstantinou eds., 2018).
29. See, e.g., PATRICK GAGE KELLEY ET AL., A “NUTRITION LABEL” FOR PRIVACY (2009).
For a recent discussion, see Christof Koolen, Transparency and Consent in Data-Driven
Smart Environments, 7 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 174 (2021).

2022]

SERIOUS NOTICE

1465

developments that may prove to be game changers that finally enable
effective privacy-related disclosure.30
Before doing so, consider a short primer on the nuts and bolts of privacy
policy intermediation, specifically regarding who must carry it out and what
it should include. Intermediation involves both simplifying and vetting
privacy disclosures. On the face of it, at least the simplification task could
be carried out by the firms themselves by providing an easily identifiable
icon or other quick indicators of the privacy setting.31 Furthermore, the firm
can publish both a long (and exhaustive) and a short (and intuitive) version
of its policies.32 This would be a form of self-reporting, possibly featuring
adherence to predefined grades, certificates, or labels for the abbreviated
self-reporting, which may be audited ex post.33
This option of self-regulation or reporting, however, is quite likely doomed
to fail given firms’ temptation to inaccurately summarize and categorize their
privacy practices.34 Using the terminology developed in the regulation
scholarship concerning certification, such self-reported information might
lack both “input” and “output” legitimacy.35 Input legitimacy relates to
“inclusiveness and transparency of the internal decision-making process with
regard to setting standards” as to what is included in the limited and
condensed disclosure.36 This process might be compromised when a firm
frames its own condensed text. For example, in the case of a label, a firm
may choose to highlight its strengths and hide (or even refrain from
mentioning) its weaknesses within the limited space of the label. This
concern is already apparent in environmental matters, where a tension has
developed between eco-labels and “greenwashing,” the practice of providing

30. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1429, 1460 (discussing various failed
intermediation attempts such as problems with Mozilla’s icon scheme and the ToS;DR
project).
31. See HANA HABIB ET AL., TOGGLES, DOLLAR SIGNS, AND TRIANGLES: HOW TO
(IN)EFFECTIVELY CONVEY PRIVACY CHOICES WITH ICONS AND LINK TEXTS §§ 3–7 (2021),
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3411764.3445387
[https://perma.cc/NT5V-8EK4]
(discussing the existing scholarship and experience with privacy icons, as well as a test as to
the effectiveness of various forms of privacy icons).
32. Note that the conventional “long” privacy policy is a form of intermediation, as well,
because it conveys in relatively simple language what the scripts and the source codes of the
website and apps are carrying out.
33. To some extent, this is the “layered disclosure” scheme advocated by some EU
regulators. See EUR. DATA PROT. BD., GUIDELINES 3/2019 ON THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL
DATA THROUGH VIDEO DEVICES 26–27 (2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_201903_video_devices_en_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X83NLD6].
34. See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (discussing the problems unfolding with
the implementation of Apple’s privacy labels).
35. See Axel Marx, Global Governance and the Certification Revolution: Types, Trends
and Challenges, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 590, 598 (David Levi-Faur
ed., 2013).
36. Id.
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environment-related information of minor and limited significance to mask
more consequential omissions and failings.37
Output legitimacy, or the lack thereof, pertains to weak enforcement
mechanisms ensuring accurate reporting in the label. When the condensed
disclosure is made by a firm itself, such accuracy might be compromised
because of self-interests. Studies have reported substantial trends of false
reporting regarding certification and meeting privacy standards.38 Therefore,
as in other domains, such as nutrition and eco-labeling, intermediation by a
third party appears to be more prudent.
To better understand the above concerns and the distinctions between
them, consider a recent review of Apple’s “privacy nutrition labels”
initiative.39 This initiative called on firms to select their appropriate privacy
setting from existing menus.40 The result is a standardized label intended to
convey, in simple form, basic privacy issues to the public.41 For instance,
the label “Data Linked to You” presents through clear icons whether the
collected information that might be linked to one’s identity pertains to
purchases, contact information, location, etc. Similar icons are provided for
a label addressing “Data Used to Track You” across apps owned by other
companies.42

37. See James. P. Nehf, Regulating Green Marketing Claims in the United States (Ind.
Univ. Robert H. McKinney Sch. of L. Working Paper, Paper No. 2018-9, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3240164
[https://perma.cc/429TRA5B].
38. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Self-Regulation and Competition in Privacy Policies, 45
J. LEGAL STUD. S13, S16, S37 (2016).
39. Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Checked Apple’s New Privacy ‘Nutrition Labels.’ Many Were
False., WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/
01/29/apple-privacy-nutrition-label/ [https://perma.cc/8MPF-J7LF].
40. See id.
41. Melanie Weir, What Are Apple’s Privacy Nutrition Labels?: Here’s What You Need
to Know About the New App Store Feature That Prioritizes User Privacy, BUS. INSIDER
(Jan. 20, 2021, 1:22 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-are-apple-privacy-nutritionlabels [https://perma.cc/J92V-2X6Q].
42. See Illustration, which pertains to one of Apple’s own products, the App Store
application.
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Illustration: Privacy Labels for Apple App Store43

This labeling scheme appears promising. At the same time, a recent review
indicated that firms constantly misrepresented their privacy practices,
making them appear more favorable than they really were, although it is
unclear whether this was intentional or rather resulted from negligence or
even an error in good faith on the part of the firm.44 Note that in this
particular labeling scheme, the labeling formats were designed by an external
party (Apple), mitigating concerns of input legitimacy (that is, that firms
would selectively decide what to reveal and how). Still, self-reporting
undermined the scheme’s output legitimacy.
In his discussion of intermediation, Reidenberg was well aware of the
shortcomings of self-reporting and pointed out several types of third parties
that could act as trusted intermediaries.45 Government may be a natural
choice, as was the case in some early data protection intermediation
schemes.46 But with the number of digital entities interacting with the public
growing exponentially, scalability becomes a challenge, and this task
exceeds the capacities of government.47 For such an extensive task, private
forms of intermediation must take center stage, with the government
developing standards for their operation.48 Alternatively, the government

43. Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/labels/ [https://perma.cc/37NK8N6A] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
44. See Fowler, supra note 39.
45. Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1424.
46. See Johanna Carvais-Palut, The French Privacy Seal Scheme: A Successful Test, in
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION SEALS. supra note 28, at 49 (discussing scheme applied in
France); Marit Hansen, The Schleswig-Holstein Data Protection Seal, in PRIVACY AND DATA
PROTECTION SEALS, supra note 28, at 35 (discussing scheme applied in the German federation
of Schleswig-Holstein).
47. Id. at 100 (indicating that today, very few schemes are owned or operated by the
government).
48. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1416.
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could merely certify or supervise the intermediaries and the standards they
developed on their own.49
Beyond the intermediation process, let us now consider its form. In the
simplest scenario, the intermediated content—such as a label—could convey
merely a binary signal of meeting or not meeting a certain standard, which
might be set by a firm or a government (for example, compliance with the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)). Indeed, a notice of EU data
protection compliance has existed for some time; recently, the process of
GDPR compliance certification has been incorporated into the GDPR’s
regulatory framework,50 but it has failed to create sufficient traction so far.51
Yet, to achieve the noted objectives of user empowerment, additional
nuances of privacy-related practices must be reported beyond a mere binary
signal.52 To intermediate effectively and efficiently, third parties must
supplement firms’ privacy policies with a simplified, yet data-rich, signal.
Nuanced—as opposed to binary—intermediation can take various forms.
This Essay focuses on labels, which might include several accepted formats
selected from a predefined menu. For example, Apple’s privacy nutrition
label includes several privacy-related parameters.53
Given the fact that a variety of intermediaries may be entering the digital
domain,54 prudent actors would be wise to devise and use universal labeling
formats. Reidenberg and his coauthors strongly emphasized the importance
of universal formatting, noting that diversification of intermediation
notification formats would result in an unworkable reality:55 there would be
too many ways in which adherence to privacy, or the lack thereof, could be
conveyed. Alas, such splintering in intermediation is currently taking place
and is likely to intensify.56 If every intermediary or every firm, when
49. See Marx, supra note 35 (addressing various options for entities developing the
schemes, distinguishing between companies, sector organizations, and independent
organizations).
50. Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, arts. 42, 43, 2016 O.J. (L
119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. See generally Reidenberg et al., supra note 9 (certifications
indicate compliance with GDPR principles).
51. For more on this issue, see Eric Lachaud, What GDPR Tells About Certification
(March 19, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3557167
[https://perma.cc/EES8-Z8TN]. Note that the relevant page indicating EU certification is
empty. Register of Certification Mechanisms, Seals and Marks, EUR. DATA PROT. BD.,
https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/accountability-tools/certification-mechanisms-sealsand-marks_en [https://perma.cc/ZT4N-V86P] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
52. For an opposing view regarding the risks of shifting beyond a binary signal, see
Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer
Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 765–67 (2009)
(surveying potential challenges by grading consumer contracts on a numeric scale).
53. Ian Carlos Campbell, Apple Will Require Apps to Add Privacy “Nutrition Labels”
Starting December 8th, VERGE (Nov. 5, 2020, 8:42 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2020/11/5/21551926/apple-privacy-developers-nutrition-labels-app-store-ios-14
[https://perma.cc/M2SH-NEM7].
54. See PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION SEALS, supra note 46, at 106 (indicating the
fragmentation in the intermediation market).
55. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1429.
56. See also Kamara & De Hert, supra note 28, at 21.
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applying their own labels and icons, uses a different format and methodology
for their aggregated and abridged disclosures, diversification follows. In this
reality, users must learn to glean the meaning of the various labels, tables,
and summaries—and their relevant nuances—to understand firms’ privacy
practices and compare them. Even with intuitive disclosure formats, such a
taxing comprehension task would prove inefficient and time-consuming, if
not intolerable.57 Labeling standards are, therefore, of the essence.
Commercial entities may step in to develop and provide disclosure
standards, but this might prove problematic because of reliability concerns,58
leading back to the government option for developing uniform labeling
templates (with possible assistance from academia). The government option
also benefits from its advantage in collecting and aggregating relevant
information that is produced by various entities operating in this space and
that would be used to develop the label.59 Similar dynamics have developed
in energy consumption and nutritional labeling.60
In sum, intermediated disclosure is important and best achieved by a
trusted third party attending to it. Moreover, intermediation by labeling is
best carried out in a unified and nuanced form. Yet, even if labeling meets
these requirements, achieving output legitimacy and, thus, effective
intermediation is far from simple. This is the challenge that Reidenberg’s
recent work sought to address while examining possible measures that take
advantage of current interconnectability and advanced technology.
2. Reidenberg on Accurate Labeling Challenges and Responses
The above mapping presents a general blueprint of how we may
successfully bridge the vast texts of privacy policies and the marginally
interested, but attention-deprived, public. It appears, however, that current
initiatives to meet this bridging task have failed.61 Reidenberg and his team
identified several key challenges that may explain such failure and
endeavored to resolve them.62 The backdrop for this analysis is the
recognition of the immenseness undermining the privacy intermediation task.

57. This concern is noted in other certification areas as well. See Marx, supra note 35, at
600 (noting the problems of fragmentation in the certification sphere).
58. Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1437. This point was made early on by A. Michael
Froomkin. See Froomkin, supra note 14, at 1526.
59. For a discussion of the advantages of the government in collecting information from
diverse segments of the cybersecurity sector and in facilitating such collection, see Eldar
Haber & Tal Zarsky, Cybersecurity for Infrastructure: A Critical Analysis, 44 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 515, 551–52 (2017).
60. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1420–21. For a discussion of the various
strategies for regulating labels in the area of nutrition, see Shmuel Becher et al., Hungry for
Change: The Law and Policy of Food Health Labeling, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1305
(2019).
61. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 38, at S15 (noting that, as of 2016, only about a quarter
of leading websites publicized compliance with a certificate).
62. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1428–33 (addressing problems); see also id. at
1441 (addressing possible solutions).
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Intermediation calls for reading, comprehending, analyzing, and
successfully conveying the contents of privacy policies. The vast number of
websites, as well as the lengths of the legal texts and their vagueness,
complexity, and difficulty, which often require specific expertise to unravel,
all lead to an insufferable project that is too onerous for ordinary humans to
undertake. To meet the immense challenge of decoding privacy notices,
Reidenberg’s team discussed the feasibility of applying two great forces that
modern technology has enabled: crowdsourcing and automation. As I now
detail, they identified substantial, but workable, problems with both. To
reach these conclusions, Reidenberg and his teams carried out two rigorous
multilevel empirical studies examining the nature of privacy notices,
particularly the degree of their ambiguity and vagueness.63 The invaluable
insights revealed in these studies explain why privacy policy intermediation
presents a unique challenge, even when applying novel methods.
In one study, published in The Journal of Legal Studies, Reidenberg and
his team examined privacy policies linguistically to establish whether vague
language compromised the semiautonomous process by which they
conducted the privacy policies’ analysis.64 This examination demonstrated
that the policies’ texts were filled with conditional and modal terms.65 Such
terms are a clear indication of vagueness that injects inaccuracy into an
automated or even semiautomated intermediation process. In yet another
empirical study, published in the Berkley Technology Law Journal,66
Reidenberg and his colleagues confirmed the inherent vagueness of privacy
notices by showing discrepancies between how experts and users understood
several key privacy policies, as well as discrepancies between understandings
within each of the tested groups.67
Based on these insights, Reidenberg turned to both crowdsourcing and
automation to examine their potential role in privacy policy intermediation.
In theory, crowdsourcing solves some of the challenges presented by the
immensity of the problem and enables intermediation. According to one
popular definition, crowdsourcing refers to “the practice of obtaining needed
services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of
people and especially from the online community.”68 The task of reading
and comprehending privacy policies in their entirety and on a grand scale
seems impossible, but it may be possible to carry it out collectively by
distributing it among the millions of online users interacting with the relevant
data aggregators. Here every such user will be performing a minimal task
while contributing to an aggregated resource. This resource would provide

63. See id. at 1434; see also Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and the
Impact of Regulation, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S165 (2016).
64. See generally Reidenberg et al., supra note 63, at S163.
65. Id. at S169–70.
66. Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 39.
67. See id.
68. Crowdsourcing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
crowdsourcing [https://perma.cc/QTV9-CBVK] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
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many other users with summaries and trusted recommendations, which,
again, may be premised on a uniform label.69
Crowdsourcing, however, has a checkered history. Early on, it was hailed
as promising a novel production method that may even successfully compete
with that of “the firm.”70 Yet, subsequent sobering analyses have shown that,
in many circumstances, the crowdsourcing dynamic—or similarly, the
reliance on an “open commons”—does not provide adequate results leading
to the successful conclusion of complex tasks.71 Some of the analyses
indicated that even when proven successful, the studied dynamic did not
involve crowdsourcing in its purest form but included some forms of
economic compensation or other property rights.72 Reidenberg feared that
crowdsourcing would fall short in the area of privacy policy comprehension
and subsequent intermediation, and as shown below, even the most avid
supporters of the power of peer production may agree.
According to a popular conceptualization of the peer production process,
it is made possible, among other reasons, by allocating overlapping granular
tasks to the masses.73 In the case of privacy policy, every participant in the
crowdsourcing initiative receives a manageable task: a small portion of a
privacy policy to review, summarize, and report on. Subsequently, the
technological infrastructure would aggregate the results into a broad
recommendation system, introducing some crucial redundancy to
double-check reviewers for errors and biases. Unfortunately, this method is
likely to fail for reasons that Reidenberg has proven empirically.
In their experiments, Reidenberg and his team found that different users
understand the same privacy-related texts quite differently.74 This finding
undermines the precision of a crowdsourced aggregated privacy grade or
evaluation, especially if it consists of an average of polarized views regarding
the meaning of contractual statements in privacy policies.75 Therefore, even
assigning overlapping granular tasks to many users would not lead to an
69. For a recommendation of the use of crowdsourcing to meet the intermediation
challenge, see Johanna Johansen et al., A Multidisciplinary Definition of Privacy Labels: The
Story of Princess Privacy and the Seven Helpers 17 (2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.01813.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BNJ-7WTW].
70. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 369, 372 (2002).
71. For an in-depth analysis of the inability of commons-like models to overcome various
vast tasks, see generally Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1751 (2010). See also Megan Wu, Quirky, the Failure of Invention Crowdsourcing,
HARVARD BUS. SCH. DIGIT. INITIATIVE (Feb. 2, 2017), https://digital.hbs.edu/platformdigit/submission/quirky-the-failure-of-invention-crowdsourcing/ [https://perma.cc/N3UHFABC] (discussing the failure of “Quirky,” a platform for invention crowdsourcing); Paul
Clough et al., Examining the Limits of Crowdsourcing for Relevance Assessment, 17 IEEE
INTERNET COMPUTING, no. 4, 2013, at 32.
72. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?: Accommodating
Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1437 (2010).
73. See Benkler, supra note 70, at 379, 435.
74. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1436; see also Reidenberg et al., supra note 11,
at 86.
75. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1432.
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adequate outcome because the inputs received from users would be too far
apart. Furthermore, the task at hand seems too complicated for the average
online reader. Thus, the number of potential reviewers is likely to be
insufficient to provide meaningful feedback for the many relevant websites
and their policies. Reidenberg noted that the enormous size and complexity
of the task is reflected in the limited feedback on privacy notices currently
available.76 Accounting for all these elements leads to the conclusion that,
alone, a review process based on crowdsourcing is unsustainable. Some of
these challenges, however, might be addressed through automation.77
In theory, highly advanced methods, such as those of natural language
processing (NLP), can quickly peruse the lengthy privacy policies, analyze
the text, and provide users with summaries or an assessment of whether the
policy meets users’ or the intermediary’s predefined preferences. The results
of this analysis can be conveyed using the standardized forms of
intermediation. These techniques hold the promise of coping with the vast
amounts of text concerning privacy policies, as has been achieved with
remarkable success in a variety of legal and other areas.78
Automation, however, is far from a panacea in this case. Although it
appears attractive in theory, in practice, matters are not so simple. For
example, Reidenberg and his team uncovered systematic faults that they
believed would render automated “reading” and intermediation of privacy
policies excessively difficult.79 Like the crowdsourcing topic above,80 this
76. See id. at 1430.
77. For a discussion of an automated tool for benchmarking and its shortcomings, see
Yonathan A. Arbel and Shmuel I. Becher, Contracts in the Age of Smart Readers, GEO. WASH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 20–21), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3740356 [https://perma.cc/G6K8-KFYL]; see also SEBASTIAN
ZIMMECK & STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, USENIX: THE ADVANCED COMPUTING SYS. ASS’N,
PRIVEE: AN ARCHITECTURE FOR AUTOMATICALLY ANALYZING WEB PRIVACY POLICIES 1
(2014) (discussing a model for ranking privacy policies based on the inclusion and exclusion
of terms).
78. For instance, some AI tools were able to successfully annotate nondisclosure
agreements (NDAs), surpassing the abilities of lawyers engaged in a similar task. See
LawGeex Hits 94% Accuracy in NDA Review vs 85% for Human Lawyers, ARTIFICIAL LAW.
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2018/02/26/lawgeex-hits-94-accuracy-innda-review-vs-85-for-human-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/HG9Y-7VKE].
For a critical
discussion of models for analyzing consumer contracts, see Noam Kolt, Predicting Consumer
Contracts, 37 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3844988 [https://perma.cc/VES4-T298]. For a discussion of the
internal and external risks of automated reading, see Arbel & Becher, supra note 77.
79. See Arbel & Becher, supra note 77. In this paper, the authors noted additional
problems and concerns related to the use of smart readers for reviewing online contracts, such
as their vulnerability to adverse “attacks,” in which text drafters used various methods to
“trick” the scanning and “reading” algorithm into grading their texts positively, even if this
was not deserved. Id. At this time, I do not find this concern to be substantial. Many of the
attack schemes noted by Arbel and Becher amount to fraud, exposing their perpetrators to
substantial liability if discovered and made public by interested parties. See id. For this reason,
I expect such attacks to be rare. Another concern noted was that these processes are driven by
“black boxes” and therefore cannot be explained after the fact. But, because these initiatives
are intended to be governed by trusted third parties or by the government, accountability-based
safeguards could be built in, limiting this concern. Id. at 30–33.
80. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.
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argument follows from the vagueness and ambiguity of privacy policies.81
Reidenberg found that trained experts have provided conflicting responses
when attempting to explain the meaning of privacy policies, rendering
reliance on machine-based learning, which would arguably be inferior to that
of experts, doubtful.82
According to Reidenberg, however, not all is lost. He offered solutions,
insights, and several silver linings that may enable effective and streamlined
intermediation for privacy policies. Based on the noted analysis, he and his
team identified key parameters for predicting when automation and
crowdsourcing may nevertheless succeed, and by contrast, when they will
utterly fail.83 For example, they argued and proved that reliance on
governmentally preapproved texts in privacy policies could limit problems
of intermediation and should be adopted and therefore encouraged whenever
possible.84 These texts would be easier to sort and intermediate through
automation, crowdsourcing, or both.
Furthermore, rather than relying exclusively on crowdsourcing or
automation, Reidenberg and colleagues recommended applying hybrid
systems in which both machines and human annotators play a role.85 They
further clarified that the tasks presented must be unambiguous, which could
help limit disparities between respondents.86 Finally, they advocated for
ongoing examination of the differences in the interpretation of privacy
policies between experts and users, as well as a continued examination of the
disparity in such understanding within the groups of users and experts
themselves.87 The results of this examination have the potential to provide
an indication of whether the outcomes of such a hybrid process could be
relied upon as a form of effective and accurate intermediated notice and,
when applicable, labeling.88
It should be noted that since the publication of Reidenberg’s (and his
collaborators’) projects, automated processes powered by artificial
intelligence and machine learning have continued to evolve and potentially
improve. Recent publications address attempts to automatically analyze
81. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 83–84.
82. See id. at 87.
83. For example, they show that for location data, individuals can grasp the privacy issues
discussed in the notices, which could therefore be properly captured by an automated process
as well. See id. at 85–86; see also Reidenberg et al., supra note 63, at S184.
84. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 63, at S181.
85. See id. at S184. For reviews of other projects analyzing privacy policies that required
similar hybrid approaches, see SHUANG LIU ET AL., HAVE YOU BEEN PROPERLY NOTIFIED?:
AUTOMATIC COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY POLICY TEXT WITH GDPR ARTICLE 13
(2021); RAZIEH NOKHBEH ZAEEM & K. SUZANNE BARBER, COMPARING PRIVACY POLICIES OF
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND COMPANIES: A STUDY USING MACHINE-LEARNING-BASED
PRIVACY POLICY ANALYSIS TOOLS 29, 38 (2021).
86. This may be achieved by regulating the language of privacy policies, either by using
predefined texts, simple texts, or recognized “logic” symbols or terms.
87. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 11, at 88.
88. Such hybrid methods create substantial challenges resulting from human overreliance
on automated decisions. For a discussion of these challenges and their possible solutions, see
Danielle K. Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1305 (2008).
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privacy policies and indicate some level of success.89 For instance, one study
compared governmental and commercial privacy policies and found the
former to be, on average, more protective than the latter—a finding which is
clearly aligned with intuition.90
It is therefore possible that, within a few years, effective, accurate, and
informative standardized automated intermediation will become a reality.
Such technologies might prove to be “game changers.” For instance, they
might render standardization efforts unnecessary, as one system might be
able to provide every user with an intermediated experience pertaining to
everything the internet has to offer. If this technology would prove effective
and available, the nature of privacy policies might also change, requiring the
rethinking of much of the discussion noted above. The analysis that follows
does not, on the whole, account for this tectonic change (although it
acknowledges the questions that will remain in place at some junctures). The
full analysis of such technologies must thus wait until the technologies
provide clear indications of competence and success.
Part I discussed the promises and serious challenges of privacy
intermediation schemes, focusing on possible structural measures to achieve
acceptable levels of input and output legitimacy when formulating labels.
Admittedly, the discussion set aside substantial scholarship adhering to
doctrines regarding the proper way to design the label and, instead, focused
on institutional aspects of the intermediation process. But, both the design
of the label itself and the nature of the interaction with the users call for
broader policy decisions. Next, Part II addresses some of these issues in view
of Reidenberg’s work.
II. TAKING REIDENBERG SERIOUSLY: DESIGNING WORKABLE SMART
DISCLOSURES
Disclosure has become a popular policy response on one hand and a
popular target of scholarly criticism on the other. In this part, I propose to
integrate Reidenberg’s intermediating disclosure model into the broader
discussion of disclosure. Relying on other aspects of Reidenberg’s
scholarship, such integration will ensure the smooth and accurate operation
of intermediation. Indeed, for innovative intermediation to succeed, we must
attend to several crucial design decisions regarding the intermediary user
interface, including establishing and meeting the objectives, priorities, and
confines of disclosure. This part also discusses personalized privacy notices
and the potential pitfalls of such a disclosure strategy, given the insights
presented above.

89. See ZAEEM & BARBER, supra note 85; LIU ET AL., supra note 85 (detailing various
studies relying on AI and machine learning to automatically analyze privacy policies).
90. See ZAEEM & BARBER, supra note 85, at 39.
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A. Basic Smart Labeling Design Decisions: Objectives and Priorities
Reidenberg’s innovative disclosure strategies are focused on condensing
much of the relevant privacy-related information into a standardized and
simple format, or label.91 Such strategies have been used, with varying
success, in other areas, including food, energy, finance, and environmental
protection.92 In the field of privacy, there have been some promising
proposals, mostly from academia, promoting labeling, including some early
prototypes.93
Such measures were also noted by U.S. regulators
contemplating the regulation of privacy94 and by tech giants considering
self-regulation.95 Reidenberg and his colleagues explain that, in the case of
privacy, a governmental entity, such as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), should be charged with the task of creating such labels and their
criteria.96 Such an entity would specify “both what factors are to be
considered—privacy practices and specific data points and how each of these
aspects is to be judged and weighted.”97 Yet, beyond the identity of the
designing entity, a variety of other decisions are required, which vary based
on: (1) the main objective of the disclosure and (2) the priorities set between
its various goals.
1. Intermediation Objectives
Earlier academic discussions regarding intermediation via labeling feature
crucial lessons for concrete privacy-related labeling schemes. In this Essay,
I focus on Professor Richard Craswell’s work, which addressed the broader
realm of disclosure requirements in contractual and administrative
contexts.98 In his scholarship, Craswell closely examined several instances
in which governments set in place disclosure formats, as well as the various
issues that ensued.99 Craswell made two crucial points. First, he emphasized
that when governments formulate disclosure policies through ranking or
labeling, they must initially establish what they seek to achieve, then move
to do so.100 This obvious point is sharpened by the observation that labels
and their design are not neutral and therefore must strive to achieve a given
objective. In other domains, such design-driving objectives included the
lowering of gas emissions or limiting human consumption of calories or
saturated fat.

91. See Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1441.
92. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 122, 136.
93. See KELLEY ET AL., supra note 29.
94. See Waldman, supra note 2, at 149–50.
95. See Campbell, supra note 53.
96. See Waldman, supra note 2, at 182.
97. Reidenberg et al., supra note 9, at 1441.
98. See Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 579 (2006).
99. See id. at 581–83. On the complexities of labeling, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER,
supra note 15, at 126.
100. See Craswell, supra note 98, at 588.
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In the area of privacy, formulating a disclosure objective may seem like a
nonevent. Disclosure and notice are assumed to be put in place to “empower
data subjects” and enable their effective choices, as per Reidenberg’s
definition adopted above and the objectives it includes.101 In the case of
privacy, disclosure is a measure serving and promoting a fundamental right,
as opposed to an instrumental objective. Therefore, there is no need for
additional focus when formulating proper disclosures.102 Yet, even
fundamental values, such as privacy, have nuances and priorities. Thus,
Craswell’s insights call for both a clear mapping of the forms of given
cognitive processes that the contemplated disclosure policies should enable
and the crafting of them accordingly.
To explain and understand the implications of this design decision for
privacy, let us return to the nature of labels. In his work, Craswell introduced
the contrast between comparison and stand-alone assessment in the use of
labels and supervised disclosure.103 When structuring privacy labels or other
forms of sophisticated disclosure, we must decide whether they must
facilitate an effective comparison of privacy practices between firms (also
referred to as a “benchmarks”)104 or a better understanding of what firms do
with our personal data.105 Here, it is possible to argue that we should have
both and simply ignore this issue.106 Yet, human attention is a zero-sum
game; therefore, it is preferable that at every juncture one objective be
selected and given preference.
As Craswell explained, the noted objectives (comparison and
understanding) are in direct conflict.107
Consider the context of
environmental protection: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
introduced the miles-per-gallon (MPG) ratings for vehicles.108 Craswell
explained that, on its own, the MPG parameter was often completely
erroneous and did not accurately reflect the mileage achieved by vehicles
(per gallon).109 But, the error was systematic for all tested vehicles.110
Therefore, the MPG rating proved highly effective because it allowed a
comparison between similar vehicles and their relative contribution to

101. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
102. Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1530.
103. See Craswell, supra note 98, at 586 (distinguishing between absolute and relative
information).
104. See Arbel & Becher, supra note 77, at 19.
105. For another discussion of the relationship between comparative and other forms of
disclosure, see Waldman, supra note 2, at 180.
106. Indeed, several recent articles addressing label design distinguished between these
objectives but noted that they both should be promoted. See RAILEAN & REINHARDT, supra
note 19, at 26–27; Johansen et al., supra note 69, at 14.
107. Craswell, supra note 98, at 585.
108. See id. at 581–82.
109. See id. at 588.
110. See id. (“In particular, as long as the ratings accurately depict the relative efficiency
of different models, they might still be perfectly adequate to give manufacturers an incentive
to try to improve their cars’ performance.”).
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pollution, which was, arguably, the objective these regulations sought to
achieve.111
In other domains, comparison-driven disclosure is less helpful or might
even prove harmful. For example, Craswell pointed to instances in which
regulators banned tobacco companies and cigarette distributors from
asserting comparative claims about the amount of tar in various cigarettes as
opposed to the amount in their competitors’ cigarettes.112 Regulators feared
that such comparative claims would undermine the overall strong message
concerning the negative consequences of smoking.113 In such cases, labels
should be constructed to focus attention on the ultimate effect of use rather
than its relative one.
Returning to the framing of labeling and disclosure policy for privacy
interests leads to a difficult dilemma concerning the need to identify the
proper emphasis in such intermediated disclosure: should the emphasis be
on regulations that promote simple comparisons between websites or rather
on those that promote the understanding of the “stand-alone” privacy value
that each website and experience provides? Intuitively, the privacy context
mandates focusing on “stand-alone” disclosures. The label should provide
greater insights about the firm’s concrete privacy practices, even at the cost
of complicating the ability to engage in a comparison between similar firms.
This position has the greatest merit when the individual’s autonomy might
be compromised, as regarding health, speech—in the case of social networks,
for instance—or finance. The greater the autonomy interest, as in the case of
health-related information, the stronger the justification for providing
independent assessments of the policy. At such points, comparisons might
only confuse individuals, leading them to erroneously believe that the subpar
data practices they are subjected to are acceptable because they are better
than those offered by others in the same industry.114 Nevertheless,
comparison-focused labeling may be the preferred policy option for
consumer websites in vibrant e-commerce markets, given the prospect of
competition.115
2. Intermediation and Prioritization
Returning to the general scholarship on information disclosure leads back
to Craswell’s second intuition, which relates to the importance of
prioritization.116 This notion focuses on an obvious benefit of a labeling
111. See id. at 588.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 590.
114. Although a comparative view may indeed empower users even when limited
competition is available, the detriments of presenting comparative advantages as
achievements are substantial.
115. For some early evidence of competition between firms regarding privacy matters, see
Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 38, at S37.
116. See Craswell, supra note 98, at 577 (“In short, there is a lot of information about every
contract that might conceivably be disclosed. As a practical matter, though, disclosing all of
this information is impossible. As a result, any disclosure rule will have to prioritize: It will
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scheme: that it succinctly presents all relevant information. But, this comes
at a price. Disclosure design is not only about requiring the publication of
certain information. Rather, it requires hard decisions about which forms of
information should be prioritized and presented saliently. In the words of
Craswell, “there is generally far more information that might be disclosed
than it would ever be possible to communicate.”117 For example, when
mandating nutrient disclosure, the government requires the publication of the
nine most important ones, rather than allowing for greater discretion for
manufacturers to list numerous items.118 The fear here is that providing
excessive flexibility might allow the obfuscation of the problematic
elements, hiding them from the public.119
This prioritization challenge is of particular relevance to labeling
initiatives in the area of privacy. If left unchecked, the most pertinent and
important aspects of privacy and information management policies might be
buried under other unimportant verbiage. In other words, firms might
manipulate disclosures to hide the most damning aspects of their operation.
Furthermore, there might be many important elements that firms and
regulators would want to disclose, but the interests of the two might not be
aligned. Deciding which facts are most important for disclosure requires an
elaborate decision-making process, which is crucial for establishing a
uniform labeling standard in matters of privacy.
Achieving proper prioritization and devising a protocol for doing so calls
for difficult and context-specific decisions.120 In matters of privacy, this
requires distinguishing between the two separate disclosure objectives noted
above: enhancing autonomy and facilitating competition.121 In most cases,
disclosures should focus on autonomy and empowerment. Therefore, the
labels should provide—almost exclusively—information on issues that are
central to the individuals’ rights and their ability to control their data—or, at
least, an aggregated version of such preferences that account for the majority
of citizens or users.
Three prioritization methods, or their combination, may be considered to
meet the prioritization challenge. First, prioritization may be determined by
a normative analysis. In this case, it would be driven by what regulators find
to be the most important aspects to consider and the easiest to understand,
perhaps influenced by academic thinkers in doing so and, naturally, by
lobbying and other interested parties that would influence the outcome.
Second, the inquiry aiming to prioritize may be “positive,” that is, driven by
have to distinguish those attributes of the contract that are worth disclosing from those that
are not.”).
117. Id. at 575.
118. See id. at 577.
119. See id. Note that since the writing of that article, governments worldwide have
introduced a range of health and food labels. See Becher et al., supra note 60, at 1323–44.
120. Yet another problem that might develop is that when only part of the elements gains
public attention, competition between firms focuses on their improvement, as opposed to other
“hidden” elements. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 176.
121. These two objectives were also noted by Ben-Shahar and Schneider. See id. at 5, 36.
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the public’s opinion and preference. Thus, the factors could be established
based on surveys. The field of privacy famously features a disparity between
these normative and positive elements, often referred to as the “privacy
paradox.”
Therefore, reliance on any one of them can generate
controversy.122
In the face of these difficulties, perhaps a third option should be explored.
This is a somewhat modified version of the previous “positive” method, and
it focuses on the elements that the public, through its access to the legal and
regulatory system, is signaling to be of interest. As opposed to surveys, the
outcome here would provide a stronger indication of interests, which, given
the aspects of regulatory selection, have a normative dimension as well.
These interests could be identified by tracking privacy-based litigation and
regulation measures and identifying the themes most frequently addressed in
the claims presented, as evident in the relevant legal documents. Research
premised on this methodology was indeed carried out by Reidenberg, in his
study from 2015, which also integrated elements of the first, normative
aspects.123 Thus, adopting this option would allow for reliance on yet
another important strand of Reidenberg’s work to promote an overall
effective privacy labeling scheme.
In the mentioned study, and in an attempt to provide a focal point for
privacy labels, Reidenberg and his team worked through the relevant case
law and regulatory history.124 In the course of this work, they identified four
key issues addressed in privacy-related litigation and regulatory enforcement
measures: (1) informing the public about the prospects of unauthorized
disclosure, (2) surreptitious collection (with respect to the information
collected and the duration of its retention), (3) insufficient security, and
(4) excessive retention of data.125 Subsequently, they turned to examine
themes that could be conveyed most effectively, thereby adding a normative
dimension to the discussion. They concluded that labeling should focus on
the first two themes—unauthorized disclosures and surreptitious
collection—as opposed to the last two, which would not be properly
understood by disclosure and were therefore unfit for labeling.126
Reidenberg’s methodology, which calls for reliance on salient litigation
and regulator-inquiry themes as indicators of prioritizing in labeling, has a
strong intuitive appeal and provides instrumental value. Following this
analytical strategy would ensure that the information needed for litigation or
regulation indeed reached those seeking to initiate these processes, whether
private parties or public servants, given the noted emphasis in the disclosure
process. This prioritization method is not without faults, however. Focusing
122. The “privacy paradox” possibly demonstrates the disparity between actual preferences
and the positions people should take regarding their personal information. See Daniel J.
Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2021) (critiquing the
notion that such disparity exists).
123. See generally Reidenberg et al., supra note 14.
124. See id. at 518–23.
125. See id. at 488.
126. See id. at 517–24.
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the public’s attention on the above elements, through disclosure, would most
likely prove biased toward certain information (given the specific claims)
while neglecting others. It would, therefore, lead to an emphasis on
information
facilitating
“practical”
claims,
while
obscuring
knowledge-promoting abstract claims and concerns that do not have clear
monetary implications and thus do not implicate substantial litigation and
regulatory measures. Furthermore, it might also be tilted toward the interests
of wealthy and sophisticated users, given their resources and ability to bring
legal actions, in turn influencing the contents of the legal docket.127 A
possible response to this critique is that such biases could be cured by
changes in court rulings and regulations. With such changes, the legislative
and regulatory map would also change over time and, with it, the disclosure
priorities. Yet, these changes might come too late and be too limited.
Therefore, norm-based considerations aiming to compensate for this
potential bias must be part of the specific methodology used to prioritize
disclosure.
The labeling strategies that focus on autonomy and empowerment must
lead the way, but at certain junctures, they should be supplemented by
attempts to promote the objective of norm-based competition between firms.
There is some initial evidence indicating heightened levels of privacy in the
presence of competition—for example, in the case of adult websites.128 Such
evidence—and the hope that competition may enhance privacy in certain
instances—calls for identifying the limited cases129 in which competition
between firms is sufficiently fierce so that privacy consideration may be
rendered salient. In these cases, firms would cater to their consumers’
privacy preferences. Here, labeling should focus on the privacy-related
elements that firms might “compete” over, similar to the way car
manufacturers compete over providing higher MPG.130 Relevant areas for
disclosure should be identified by additional testing and research. Intuitively,
they may include labeling information pertaining to the sharing of personal
data with third parties and limitations on collection data points that
individuals deem as sensitive and that are possibly drivers of competition
between firms.
B. Personalized Disclosures: A Cautionary Note
The discussion so far assumes that intermediated privacy notices and
labels would be distributed in uniform fashion—that is, all users would
receive the same information in the same format. Recently, however,
academics have begun promoting the notion of personalized disclosures to
127. Note that this particular concern for bias may be eased by class actions, which may
bring the voice of the masses to the forefront, and by regulatory focus on weaker social
segments.
128. See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 38, at S37.
129. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
130. See
Fuel
Economy
Government,
U.S.
DEPT.
ENERGY,
OF
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/ [https://perma.cc/Q9V8-WNXV] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022)
(providing MPG comparisons).
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be tailored to individual persons, premised on their relevant personal traits
and projected preferences, and powered by big data.131 In theory, regulators
may formulate lists of privacy-related priorities for various demographics
(age, gender, domicile), relying on the prioritization methodologies noted
above: normative, based on surveys, or derived from litigation for the
particular social segment to which the user belongs. They may even provide
some users with comparative information and others with an independent,
stand-alone factor. To further perfect the process, users should be able to opt
out of the category into which they were placed and signal different
disclosure preferences if they believe they have not been properly
classified.132
On its face, a personalized label with different salient elements for every
individual would offer greater utility with respect to privacy. With such
personalization in place, the information every attention-deprived user
receives would be of greater accuracy and relevance, resulting in an optimal
outcome. Yet, such schemes raise substantial enforcement challenges and
might actually not be advisable when it comes to privacy.133 This concern is
based on the fact that the interests of the entity governing the disclosures—
ideally a trusted third party supervised by the government—and the
disclosing parties are often unaligned: the latter might be trying to hide from
their users certain segments of information, which the former may wish to
disclose.134 With such personalization in place, therefore, it would be
extremely difficult for an external auditor to track whether all individuals are
receiving appropriate disclosures. It would also be difficult to examine
whether the label and the relevant firm’s full privacy policy match. Finally,
after the fact, it would be almost impossible to track whether firms have
abided by the concrete (and abridged) privacy-related promises they made to
every user.
As noted above, with respect to privacy, the intermediation challenge has
grown too vast and complex to be carried out by a central, human-operated
process, although some aspects of it require close human scrutiny.135
Shifting to a personalized regime would further stretch the rather thin
enforcement effort beyond its feasible limits. Furthermore, personalization
131. See generally Ariel Porat & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and
Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014). See also Arbel & Becher, supra
note 77, at 26.
132. See Arbel & Becher, supra note 77, at 92. See generally Christoph Busch,
Implementing Personalized Law: Personalized Disclosures in Consumer Law and Data
Privacy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 309 (2019). For a suggestion to do so, see Johansen et al.,
supra note 69, at 12–13.
133. See Busch, supra note 132, at 329–30. For a discussion of the general skepticism
about personalization regarding disclosure, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at
134.
134. The fact that personalization is carried out through an intermediation process initiated
by a separate entity most likely causes the uniqueness of personalization challenges that this
Essay addresses and is what distinguishes it from the various instances covered in Porat and
Strahilevitz’s general discussion of their model’s challenges. See Porat and Strahilevitz, supra
note 131.
135. See supra Part I.B.2.
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would undermine the ability to rely on crowdsourcing initiatives to monitor
proper privacy disclosures and labeling, given the splintering of the recipient
audience into many subgroups. In other words, if personalized labels are
distributed, the number of people with access to each specific label to enable
its review and with an interest in doing so would substantially diminish,
further limiting the small pool of qualified assessors. Automated measures
may be considered to examine the accuracy of personalized intermediation,
but as explained above, distinct human supervision is essential to supplement
this process—at least until AI and machine-learning methods are good
enough to engage in independent labeling and intermediation. Thus, in view
of the insights provided by Reidenberg, personalized disclosures would
multiply regulators’ tasks, perhaps creating an overly burdensome challenge
and making personalization a poor fit for smart privacy disclosures at this
time.
III. THE PRACTICAL CHALLENGES OF RANKING AND GRADING IN A
REPEAT GAME
As the discussion above indicates, privacy intermediation, including
labeling, has existed for some time, but it has yet to be broadly and
successfully implemented. The mapping and analysis above detail how
labeling schemes can be designed to potentially overcome the challenges,
relying on the important work of Reidenberg and others. Successfully
designing and deploying labels marks only the start of an efficacious
intermediation process. This initial step must be followed by an ex post
examination that the firm’s policy disclosures are consistent with the labels
provided. This examination is best conducted by a process that combines
automation, crowdsourcing, and human intervention. These steps must be
followed by an enforcement process that takes measures against firms whose
conduct fails to meet the standards and commitments set out in their privacy
policies—long and short.136
Beyond these aspects of the process—and the challenges they create—lies
a secondary set of problems and unintended consequences: the potential
trivialization of labels and rankings over time, which undermines the very
objectives that intermediation strives to promote. These must be addressed
when assuming that the intermediation of privacy polices will play a
meaningful role in the personal information ecosystem. Ironically, this risk
becomes more acute once the labels gain importance and salience. The
discussion that follows suggests that policy makers should remain vigilant
even after the intermediation process has been implemented and moved to
the operational stage. This is because affected parties—naturally, those
being labeled and ranked—have a strong incentive to act strategically to

136. This is, to some degree, already carried out by the FTC, albeit in a limited way, given
the scarcity of resources. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and
the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
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improve their position. Given these concerns, unique policy responses are
needed.137
To demonstrate and explain this concern, consider the instructive case of
restaurant hygiene.138 Several cities, such as New York City and San Diego,
have introduced grading systems to signal restaurants’ sanitary conditions.139
Many are familiar with the letter-based ranking prominently displayed at
establishments that serve food or have kitchens. These labeling (and thus,
intermediation) initiatives were thought to enhance transparency and lower
food poisoning levels throughout the regulated areas.140 Yet, a study that
tracked and assessed the effect of this regulatory scheme discovered that the
overall ranking-driven improvement in hygiene was merely an illusion.141
The study also found the grading processes to be deeply flawed, with a clear
bias toward higher grades.142 The hygiene grading process, therefore,
produced substantial grade inflation. Although establishments with low
grades became scarce, the overall health benefit was questionable. Seeking
explanations for the rankings’ failure to promote hygiene, the study dug
deeper, exposing systematic failings in the ranking process. It found that,
given the visibility of the hygiene intermediation scheme, when
establishments received a low grade, they sought to appeal the process; this
granted them the right to a reinspection, for which they were often able to
prepare.143 The motivations for requesting a reinspection may have also been
linked to the fact that grading turned out to be a difficult task, with vast
disparities between the grades given by different inspectors at different
times.144
The vast wave of reinspection of restaurant hygiene had several
unfortunate outcomes. First, it resulted in an inefficient allocation of
resources. Rather than cracking down and sanctioning establishments with
very poor hygiene,145 ranking institutions invested substantial resources in
the reinspection of clean establishments that missed an “A” grade by a few
points.146 Furthermore, the reinspection process was often prearranged,
limiting the effects of a surprise visit (an aspect that might have less of an
effect on the privacy issue explored here, as I discuss below).
Returning to the matter of privacy disclosure, it is reasonable to consider
the lessons that may be learned from this ranking blunder and the biased
137. For an exploration of the challenges arising from the ongoing adjustments of behavior
in the algorithmic space, see generally Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2018).
138. See generally Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and
Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012).
139. See id. at 583–85 (listing jurisdictions).
140. See id. at 582–83.
141. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 15, at 43.
142. In San Diego, 99.9 percent of the establishments received a maximum grade. See Ho,
supra note 138, at 610.
143. See id. at 612 (noting the limited value of “strategic cleanups for regrading”).
144. See id. at 642.
145. See id. at 647.
146. See id.
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grades that ensued. Thus we must ask: would the privacy-related labeling
system lead to grade inflation and the trivialization of the results over time?
To learn from the restaurant hygiene case, we must look beyond its raw facts.
The hygiene study focuses on two possible sets of problems that would most
likely plague privacy intermediation should it gain traction and importance.
The first pertains to the process (of repeated, wasteful retesting) and, second,
with its outcomes (the grade inflation and limited attention paid to institutions
with poor hygiene). Below, I consider both elements from the perspective of
privacy.
Regarding the process, it is fair to assume that, with a widespread,
government-initiated, and broadly recognized labeling scheme, relatively
low grades (even those merely falling from a maximum one) would prove
harmful to a firm’s reputation. Therefore, grading will be followed by
grading disputes. This prediction is not far-fetched even if we move beyond
the realm of hygiene and into that of technology. For years, e-commerce
firms, such as eBay, have been devoting substantial resources to resolving
disputes concerning reputation resulting from contested grades.147 As
reputation gained prominence in the digital age, the grading dynamics it
featured have become vitally important to those subjected to it.148 The same
dynamic might follow regarding privacy-related grades, which will gain
importance over time. With such importance emerging, pressure to receive
a higher grade will follow. Such pressure serves not only as an incentive for
parties to work harder to improve the evaluated process but also to attempt
to influence the grading process. Therefore, it is fair to assume that if privacy
labeling and grading become important, privacy grading disputes will tax and
encumber the intermediation process. Unchecked, the disputes that will
follow can lead to the allocation of funds to reinspect entities that are
relatively privacy-abiding, rather than investigating egregious privacy
violations—given that funding for these intermediation objectives is limited.
Privacy ranking and restaurant sanitation are indeed very different topics,
and one might question the applicability of lessons from one to the other. But
given the nature of the difference between them, such differences arguably
exacerbate the problems that might evolve in the privacy realm, thus
strengthening the need to closely monitor the problem here addressed in the
privacy context. Indeed, there are many more accessible websites and datacollecting entities than kitchen facilities in any given city, county, or state.
Furthermore, food poisoning is assumedly far more noticeable than breaches
of privacy. As opposed to the inspection of food establishments, privacy
inspections will, most likely, be carried out by private parties in a diffused
process. In view of all these differences, it is fair to assume that, with respect
to privacy, inspection resources would be even more limited and further
stretched by reinspection than they have been for food inspection.
Furthermore, the absence of government inspection will lead to an even
147. See M. ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY,
AND THE INTERNET OF DISPUTES 70 (2017).
148. See COHEN, supra note 21, at 79–80.
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greater disparity in testing results, given higher turnover of inspectors who
will not have the job security that government positions offer. Similarly,
disparities in the review of privacy policies will be greater than those in
sanitation, in view of the inherent ambiguity of privacy as opposed to the
relatively concrete issues involved in sanitation. Finally, because the stakes
of privacy ranking are lower than those involved in sanitation (where food
poisoning can cause bodily damage), the inspectors will be likely to take their
job less seriously, opening the door to errors. The prospect of errors and the
reversal of a decision in response to appeal will eventually lead to higher
demand for reinspection, resulting, again, in poor resource allocation for
inspections. This all might change with a shift to a wholly automated process
premised on AI, which might lead to fewer errors and limited discrepancies
between reviews. Yet, as explained above, this is not yet the case, and until
technology catches up, appeals are going to be a substantial part of the
assessment process.
The prospects of disputes and the reexamination that might follow will
also affect outcomes. Ongoing requests to review the ranking in a
complicated process that leads to disparate results may end up pushing grades
upward. Only low grades would be appealed, as website operators try their
luck with a fickle grading process. Given the competition between labeling
entities, entities that receive a low ranking (or a “bad” label) might trade one
intermediary for another that is more likely to grant a better review. This
dynamic will initiate a “race to the top” in grades (or “to the bottom” in grade
validity). Therefore, it is quite likely that the grading and labeling schemes
will lead to grade inflation, creating a somewhat meaningless environment in
which a vast number of entities receive maximum grades that do not
necessarily reflect a high level of privacy.
A caveat is in order here. Unlike the case of hygiene, knowledge of an
upcoming privacy inspection need not lead to biased results. Privacy
policies, unlike kitchens, cannot be hastily cleaned and subsequently
neglected. Admittedly, a privacy policy could be changed only during the
inspection period, then changed back after its conclusion. But, such actions
would likely amount to fraud and thus are less likely to occur (and they are
beyond the scope of this analysis). Therefore, it is difficult to affirm with
confidence that substantial grade inflation will follow repeated privacy
inspections, but the elements noted above do convincingly seem to point in
that direction.
The potential problems related to the process and outcome of labeling are
not beyond repair and must be addressed through various structural measures
taken when the systems are being introduced. Below are several suggestions
that may be further developed. First, grade inflation can be addressed by
applying and enforcing grading curves or stricter grading measures.149
149. Applying grading curves might raise fairness problems as it might result in situations
in which small differences between entities might be nonetheless reflected in large ones in the
ranking process, given their position on the curve. For a discussion of these issues and their
normative implications, see Jane R. Bambauer et al., When a Small Change Makes a Big
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Second, overwhelming requests for reinspection and challenging of grades
must be regulated as part of system design by limiting the right of appeal and
flagging cases where there is a substantial grade disparity at reinspection.
Third, responses to both concerns of process and outcome should be
through various forms of transparency.150 For example, when ranking by
third parties is made publicly available, it must be supplemented by
information about reexaminations, grade distribution, and errors revealed
during reinspection. Although the public will most likely ignore or fail to
properly comprehend such metatransparency data, the prospect of its
disclosure is likely to mitigate concerns of resource misallocation and grade
inflation. As in other domains, the “spotlight bias” suggests that the prospect
of these forms of information disclosure will influence and improve the way
providers operate ex ante—after all, executives do not like to disclose that
they are running a biased operation.151 Furthermore, apparent failures in the
grading process and grading outcomes should provide an incentive to those
involved in these processes to either correct the grades or risk losing
credibility (or government licensing, when applicable). This would be
especially true when some form of competition between labeling entities
exists.
Finally, it is fair to assume that entities that are ranked or labeled in a way
they disagree with may seek legal remedies.
Thus, engaging in
intermediation—or failure to do so properly—may result in legal liability for
the ranking entity, whether it is the government, a trusted NGO, or a
for-profit corporation. Generally, policy makers would be wise to strive to
ensure that such liability is properly balanced and does not lead to
overdeterrence by those claiming to have been wronged (by bringing legal
action and claiming damages). Yet they might also use the prospect of such
liability to resolve some of the noted concerns. Among others, legislatures
could limit, and thereby calibrate, such liability by introducing laws shielding
designated ranking entities from liability when it is proven that they carried
out their task diligently. Such a legal regime may resemble the way in which
the Fair Credit Reporting Act152 (FCRA) preempts most common-law and
state law claims by ranked individuals against credit rating agencies, if the
agencies are found to comply with certain rules and standards.153 In addition
to such laws (and clearly in their absence), labeling and ranking providers
should be allowed to employ other strategies as a hedge against such risks;
Difference, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2022). Generally, if the rules of ranking are
known in advance to all relevant parties, the risk of unfairness is somewhat mitigated. See id.
150. See Ho, supra note 138, at 650; see also Waldman, supra note 2, at 177–78 (discussing
the importance of maintaining transparency in design).
151. See George Loewenstein et al., Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything,
6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391, 403 (2014).
152. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 and 18 U.S.C.).
153. See Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 4–14
(2008) (providing a critical discussion of the various steps the U.S. Congress has taken to limit
the liability of credit agencies by shielding them from state law claims and allowing claims
under the FCRA to continue, but only if certain conditions are met).
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for example, by insuring their activities or engaging in other risk-spreading
strategies.154
Further consideration of these aspects of intermediary liability and its
limits is an integral part of any attempt to design an efficient labeling scheme.
Such moves are closely related to the process- and outcome-based concerns
discussed here. Indeed, liability issues must be tied to the various
institutional decisions contemplated above, regarding the precision of the
process, the grading range, and the extent of appeals—for example, by
providing regulatory liability waivers only to ranking entities that meet an
acceptable standard of conduct.155 Thus, in addition to the requirement for
transparency, the government may use liability as a lever to mitigate the risk
of ranking trivialization over time.
CONCLUSION: LONG LIVE THE PRIVACY POLICY!
The insights that Reidenberg, a serious and seasoned privacy scholar,
derived from his studies led him to a conclusion that many in the privacy
community would prefer to ignore: the privacy policy is here to stay. These
policies are the go-to documents that consumers, experts, journalists, judges,
and apparently academics examine to assess privacy practices. Like many
other legal documents, privacy policies are rarely read, but they have unique
qualities that Reidenberg went to great lengths to expose and explore. They
cannot be easily grouped with terms of service, terms of use, and other
standard form contracts.
With some tweaking, Reidenberg’s work could certainly be used to
establish a strategy as to how to educate the public about the content of these
policies. Such education would entail smart design of intermediation and an
ongoing evaluation process. This Essay mapped out some of the important
steps a sustainable labeling process should include. It also pointed out the
need to establish and prioritize the objectives of labels, set aside
personalization efforts, and attend to a structured appeals process.
My work on this Essay started out as a celebration of Joel Reidenberg’s
scholarship. After completing its first draft, I received the terrible news of
Joel’s passing. The recognition that Joel will not read these words and build
on them in his future projects is greatly saddening. That said, I hope that
others will continue walking in his large footsteps and address the crucial
matters he pursued with the same rigor, passion, and gravity that
characterized Joel’s long and fruitful career. He will be missed, and may his
memory be a blessing.

154. One of these could be self-insurance by charging a premium from all consumers.
155. For a passing reference to the liability issue in ranking, see generally Kamara and De
Hert, supra note 28.

